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WHERE TO PUT IT ALL? OPENING THE JUDICIAL
ROAD FOR A LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO THE
NATION'S NUCLEAR WASTE PROBLEM
Tom Kenny*
INTRODUCTION
In 1983, Congress passed and the President signed into law the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA),I which directed the Department of
Energy (DOE) to enter into contracts with generators of nuclear waste
to collect that waste in return for payment of fees.2 The DOE would
use the fees to construct a permanent geologic repository for long-
term storage of the nuclear waste.3 Unfortunately for all parties
involved, the government, despite collecting billions of dollars in fees,
has never been able to build the repository.4
In 1997, nuclear power plant operators asked for and received a
writ of mandamus from the D.C. Circuit that barred the government
from resorting to an unavoidable delays clause in its contract with the
utilities that would have freed the government from liability for
breach of its contracts.5 This Note will argue that the D.C. Circuit
exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing this writ and infringed on the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims to interpret the
federal government's contractual obligations. The writ has contrib-
uted to stifling efforts to come up with a workable long-term solution
to the nation's nuclear waste problem.
Part I will examine the history of the search to find a long-term
storage option for nuclear waste, why efforts to build a permanent
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2011; B.A., Georgetown
University, 2005.
1 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (2006)).
2 42 U.S.C. § 10136.
3 Id. § 10131.
4 See Matthew L. Wald, U.S. Decides One NuclearDump Is Enough, N.Y. TNMES, Nov.
7, 2008, at A21.
5 See N. States Power Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 128 F.3d 754, 756 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
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geologic repository failed, and what led to the D.C. Circuit's issuing an
extraordinary writ of mandamus. Part II discusses the effects of the
writ on the ongoing nuclear waste litigation in the Court of Federal
Claims. Parts III and V then discuss how the government finally
decided to mount a collateral attack against the writ of mandamus
and why the Court of Federal Claims correctly found the writ to be
void for want of jurisdiction. Part V will address how the Federal Cir-
cuit reversed the Court of Federal Claims and reinstated the writ,
which once again greatly reduced the possibilities of the interested
parties working toward an effective, efficient, and long-term solution
to the nation's nuclear waste problem.
I. BACKGROUND: WHERE TO PUT IT ALL?
Since Enrico Fermi produced the first controlled atomic chain
reaction at the University of Chicago during World War Two, the fed-
eral government and the states have struggled with how to safely dis-
pose of the waste generated from the production of nuclear power. 6
As of 2007, there were over 100 commercial nuclear reactors operat-
ing in the United States, which produced some 2,000 metric tons of
waste annually.7 In 1998, the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management calculated that "commercial reactors had produced
38,400 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste."8 That
same office determined that if each of the nation's licensed reactors
"finishes out its 40-year license, the [amount of] waste will reach
100,000 metric tons by the year 2035."g Additionally, these estimates
"reflect only civilian nuclear waste, and do not consider the spent fuel
from defense-related activities, including nuclear weapons, research,
and nuclear-powered submarines, which will account for 2,500 addi-
tional metric tons of waste needing permanent disposal."'10 With
some of the waste containing materials that will be lethal for more
than 200,000 years,1' the necessity of a stable, long-term solution is
obvious.
6 SeeJudith Miller, Planning Safe Half-Life of Radioactive Wastes, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
1982, at E22.
7 Annemarie Wall, Going Nowhere in the Nuke of Time: Breach of the Yucca Contract,
Nuclear Waste Policy Act Fallout and Shelter in Private Interim Storage, 12 ALB. L. ENVrL.
OUTLOOKJ. 138, 149 (2007).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 149-50.
11 See Miller, supra note 6.
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A. Options Discarded
Since the 1950s, the National Academy of Sciences and other
agencies in the federal government have studied a number of differ-
ent options for the containment, storage, and disposal of nuclear
waste.1 2 In 1959, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Pyotr Kapitsa of Rus-
sia proposed sending nuclear waste to outer space, and scientists in
the United States discussed transporting nuclear waste on the space
shuttle, an idea that lost support after the explosion of the Challenger
in 1986.13 Scientists have discussed the idea of disposing of nuclear
waste at the polar ice sheets by placing it in corrosion-resistant con-
tainers and allowing it to melt through the ice down to the bedrock
below. 14 However, fears of the waste seeping into the ocean led to an
international agreement which prohibited this proposal from coming
to fruition.' 5 "Scientists have also considered the disposal of nuclear
waste in holes drilled approximately six miles beneath the Earth's sur-
face. However, scientists currently do not know enough about the
effects the extreme pressure and extreme temperature would have on
the waste, which effectively negated this option." 16 Scientists both in
the United States and abroad have considered other options, such as
ocean dumping, subseabed disposal, 17 and reprocessing the spent
nuclear fuel to recover uranium and plutonium, but for a variety of
reasons, these proposals have never gained much traction.18
In the absence of an alternative, the solution that has emerged is
on-site storage at the nuclear power plant facilities. 19 The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) determined it had "reasonable assur-
ance that, if necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be
stored safely and without significant environmental impacts for at
least 30 years beyond the expiration of that reactor's operating
licenses at that reactor's spent fuel storage basin."20 The NRC also
decided to allow for storage "at either onsite or offsite independent
12 SeeWall, supra note 7, at 150.
13 See Robin Dusek, Note, Lost in Space?: The Legal Feasibility of Nuclear Waste Dispo-
sal in Outer Space, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'v Rv. 181, 195 (1997).
14 See David P. Ross, Note, Yucca Mountain and Reversing the Irreversible: The Need for
Monitored Retrievable Storage in a Permanent Repository, 25 VT. L. REv. 815, 818-19
(2001).
15 See Wall, supra note 7, at 153-54.
16 Id. at 154 (footnote omitted).
17 See id. at 151.
18 See id. at 154.
19 See id. at 155.
20 Waste Confidence Decision, 49 Fed. Reg. 34,658, 34,658 (Aug. 31, 1984) (to be
codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 50-51).
2011]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
spent fuel storage installations."2 1 Still, storing spent nuclear fuel at
the power plants themselves was never the NRC's preference, possibly
because so many of the nation's nuclear power facilities are located
near populous areas as well as rivers and sea coasts. 22 The recent dis-
aster at the Fukushima Daiichi facility in northeast Japan following an
earthquake in March 2011 focused new attention on the risks involved
in storing spent nuclear fuel on site.23 The earthquake damaged
seven of the cooling pools that stored spent fuel rods at the facility
and six weeks after the earthquake, three of those seven cooling pools
were still emitting radiation. 24 In a later rulemaking, the NRC noted
that while it only allowed for a thirty year on-site storage period, it did
not dispute that "dry spent fuel storage is safe and environmentally
acceptable for a period of 100 years. ' 25 However, the NRC rulemak-
ing went on to declare that despite this long potential period of safe,
on-site storage, it "supports timely disposal of spent fuel and high-level
waste in a geologic repository, and by this Decision does not intend to
support storage of spent fuel for an indefinitely long period."26
B. An Answer in the Desert: A Permanent Geologic Repository
Disposing nuclear waste in a permanent geologic repository
involves "placing contained and packaged waste into tunnels which
are surrounded by several levels of barriers, and that are engineered
to contain the waste for several thousands of years." 27 With the goal of
establishing just such a repository and with it a long-term solution to
the nation's spent nuclear fuel storage problems, Congress enacted
and President Reagan signed the NWPA on January 7, 1983.28 The
NWPA declared that "[f1ederal efforts during the past 30 years to
devise a permanent solution to the problems of civilian radioactive
waste disposal have not been adequate."29 The NWPA's purpose was
21 Id.
22 See Wall, supra note 7, at 155.
23 Matthew L. Wald, Japan Nuclear Crisis Revives Long U.S. Fight on Spent Nuclear
Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2011, at Al
24 Polly Kreisman, Special Report: Indian Point and "Undue Risk"?, THELOOP (APR.
23, 2011), http://theloopny.com/2011/04/23/special-report-indian-point-and-
undue-risk.
25 Waste Confidence Decision Review, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,474, 38,482 (Sept. 18,
1990) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 51).
26 Id.
27 Wall, supra note 7, at 156.
28 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (2006)).
29 42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(3).
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"to establish a schedule for the siting, construction, and operation of
repositories that will provide a reasonable assurance that the public
and the environment will be adequately protected from the hazards
posed by high-level radioactive waste and such spent nuclear fuel as
may be disposed of in a repository." 30
While the NWPA contemplated that the DOE would manage the
disposal of nuclear waste, it also contemplated that the nuclear power
plant operators would foot the bill through the establishment of a
Nuclear Waste Fund.31 The NWPA authorized the Secretary of
Energy to enter into contracts with nuclear power plant operators for
the payment of fees in exchange for accepting nuclear waste. 32 Criti-
cally, the NWPA effectively made it mandatory for nuclear power
plant operators to enter into the contracts by prohibiting the NRC
from issuing or renewing an operating license unless the plant had
entered into or was negotiating with the DOE to enter into such a
contract.3 3 Just as critically, the NWPA mandated that in return for
the payment of fees, the DOE would begin to dispose of the nuclear
waste "not later than January 31, 1998. " 3 4
Pursuant to its authority under this section of the NWPA, "[t] he
DOE engaged in an administrative hearing process to create a single
contract with identical terms"35 and promulgated its Standard Con-
tract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioac-
tive Waste (the "Standard Contract") .36 The Standard Contract sets
out a schedule of associated fees3 7 and, as the NWPA mandates, pro-
vides for the DOE to begin performing under the contract "not later
thanJanuary 31, 1998 and shall continue until such time as all [spent
nuclear fuel] . . .has been disposed of."'38
But even before the President signed the NWPA into law, legisla-
tors began to raise concerns about the method the NWPA established
30 Id. § 10131(b)(1).
31 See id. § 10131(b) (4) (mandating the establishment of a "Nuclear Waste Fund,
composed of payments made by the generators and owners of such waste and spent
fuel, that will ensure that the costs of carrying out activities relating to the disposal of
such waste and spent fuel will be borne by the persons responsible for generating
[it]").
32 Id. § 10222(a)(1).
33 See id. § 10222(b)(1)(A).
34 Id. § 10222(a) (5) (B).
35 PSEG Nuclear, L.L.C. v. United States, 465 F.3d 1343, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
36 10 C.F.R. § 961.11 (2010).
37 Id. § 961.11, art. VIII.
38 Id. § 961.11, art. II.
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for choosing the site of the permanent geologic repository.39 The Act
directed the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with interested par-
ties including the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Council on Environmental Quality, the Director of the
U.S. Geological Survey, the NRC, and the governors of potentially
affected states, to issue guidelines for the recommendation of sites. 40
The Act mandated that the guidelines specify, among other factors,
"population factors that will disqualify any site from development as a
repository if any surface facility of such repository would be located
... in a highly populated area."41 The Secretary would then nominate
five potentially suitable sites and recommend three to the President4 2
who would then, "in his discretion," approve or disapprove within 60
days of a particular candidate site. 43
While the Senate approved the NWPA by an overwhelming 69-9
vote,44 even legislators who were supportive of the bill quickly lined up
to explain why the federal government could not place the permanent
repository in their own respective home states.45 Many felt that Con-
gress was unnecessarily locking itself into an inadequate long-term
solution. 46
One site, though, that emerged as a favorite and seemingly logi-
cal choice was an outcropping of volcanic ash at Yucca Mountain in
the Nevada desert.47 The Yucca Mountain site was such a natural
choice for the repository because it was adjacent to the Nevada test
site, where the Department of Defense had detonated more than 600
nuclear weapons in the previous three decades. 48 The site covered an
area the size of Rhode Island and since 1962 the military had con-
ducted all nuclear tests at the site in underground shafts and tun-
39 See Mary McGrory, Op-Ed., Nuclear Waste: Problem No One Wants, and It Won't Go
Away, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1982, at A3.
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 10132(a) (2006).
41 Id.
42 Id. § 10132(b) (1).
43 Id. § 10132(c) (1).
44 See Miller, supra note 6.
45 See McGrory, supra note 37 ("Rep. Trent Lott (R-Miss.), who has never been
known as an enemy of nuclear power plants, nonetheless has been at considerable
pains to see that Mississippi is outlawed as the home of an interim waste depository.").
46 See id. ("That's why the rush to judgment strikes [Rep. Shirley] Chisholm [(D.-
N.Y.)] and many others as unseemly. Having waited this long, Congress might well
take a little more time to decide a question for the ages.").
47 See Milton R. Benjamin, Radioactive Waste May Be Interred Beneath a Site of Its
Birth, WASH. PosT, May 26, 1983, at A2.
48 See id.
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nels.4 9 The shafts and tunnels were strong enough to survive the
nuclear detonations and many of them were already twice the size
envisaged for the underground waste repository.
50
The DOE had begun exploratory efforts at Yucca Mountain in
1979, more than three years before the President signed the NWPA
into law.51 At the time, the director of the Energy Department's
Waste Management Project Office in Las Vegas stated that,
"[b]asically, the view was that [Yucca Mountain] already [was] con-
taminated with radioactive material and there was very little chance
this land mass would be turned back to the public domain in an
uncontrolled way."' 52 Additionally, geologists and hydrologists discov-
ered a feature of Yucca Mountain that made it particularly attractive
among locations under consideration for the permanent repository.
53
The water table at Yucca Mountain was 1,800 feet below the surface,
which allowed for the construction of a repository in an unsaturated
zone above standing water.54 So at the time, Yucca Mountain had the
dual advantage of the DOE being familiar with building underground
structures there and it being technically suitable for a nuclear waste
repository.5 5
C. Moving Toward Breach of Contract
Thus, to the surprise of probably no one, in 1987 Congress
amended the NWPA to mandate that the Secretary of Energy limit his
consideration of site feasibility to Yucca Mountain. 5 6 However, even at
this early date, the DOE's plan to build a permanent, underground
geologic repository appeared to be going off track. Power plant oper-
ators have alleged that even then, "[the] DOE was already more than
ten years behind schedule, and had not developed any contingency
plans for meeting the January 31, 1998, deadline" established both in
the NWPA and the Standard Contract. 57 In 1993, several states and
49 Id.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 Id. (quoting Donald R. Vieth, Director, Energy Department's Waste Manage-
ment Project Office in Las Vegas).
53 See id.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 See 42 U.S.C. § 10133(a) (2006) ("The Secretary shall carry out, in accordance
with the provisions of this section, appropriate site characterization activities at the
Yucca Mountain site.").
57 Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States, 73 Fed. CI. 650, 653 (2006), rev'd, 590
F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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utilities asked the DOE to address its ability to meet the 1998 dead-
line.58 The DOE responded that it did not have a clear statutory obli-
gation to accept spent nuclear fuel if it had not yet constructed an
operational repository.59
In 1994, the DOE published a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) 60 reaffirm-
ing this opinion. 61 It acknowledged that "the earliest possible date for
acceptance of waste for disposal at a repository is 2010,"62 more than a
decade after the 1998 date in both the NWPA and the Standard Con-
tract. In the NOI, the DOE explained how the Standard Contract
used the term "facility" as opposed to the term "repository" used in
the N"WA. 63 It explained that the Standard Contract used a different
term in recognition of the possibility "that a Monitored Retrievable
Storage (MRS) Facility may be available before a repository and could
meet the intent of [the NWPA] ."64 However, according to the DOE,
the 1987 amendments to the NWPA which identified Yucca Mountain
as the site for the permanent geologic repository also precluded the
DOE from beginning construction on an MRS facility until the NRC
had authorized construction on a repository.65 In essence, the DOE
was claiming that Congress had tied its hands and thus relieved it
from any legal obligation under the Standard Contract. The DOE
urged that the "federal government . . . take immediate action to
establish centralized interim storage capability by 1998, including the
commencement of an effort to develop such capability at one or more
federal sites." 66
Not surprisingly, states and nuclear power plant operators were
less than satisfied with this response and shortly thereafter, twenty of
the thirty three states that have nuclear facilities along with fourteen
utilities filed suit against the DOE. 67 Pursuant to the judicial review
provision of the NWPA, 68 they brought their suit in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which dismissed their claim on the
58 See Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272, 1274 (D.C. Cir.
1996); Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 73 Fed. CI. at 653.
59 See nd. Mich. Power Co., 88 F.3d at 1274; Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 73 Fed. CI. at 653.
60 Notice of Inquiry: Waste Acceptance Issues, 59 Fed. Reg. 27,007 (May 25,
1994).
61 See id. at 27,007.
62 Id. at 27,008.
63 See id.
64 Id.
65 See id.
66 Id.
67 See Editorial, Forcing a Decision on Nuclear Waste, CHI. TniB.,July 24, 1994, § 4, at
2.
68 42 U.S.C. § 10139(a)(2) (2006).
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ground that the NOI did not constitute final agency action. 69 How-
ever, one year later the DOE did issue a final interpretation basically
restating what it had said in the NOI a year earlier-that it did not
have "an unconditional statutory or contractual obligation to accept
high level waste and spent nuclear fuel [by] January 31, 1998 in the
absence of a repository or interim storage facility."70 It also held that
it lacked statutory authority under the NWPA to provide interim stor-
age.7 1 Finally, the DOE held that even if it did have an unconditional
obligation, the "Delays" clause in "the Standard Contract provides that
neither party shall be liable for damages in the case of unavoidable
delay" while providing that in the event of an avoidable delay, the
charges and schedules should be "'equitably adjusted to reflect any
estimated additional costs incurred by the party not responsible for or
contributing to the delay.' ",72 It noted that the Standard Contract pro-
vided for a factual determination of whether the delay was unavoida-
ble or not by the designated contracting officer with a right of appeal
to the DOE Board of Contract Appeals. 7 3
With a final decision from the DOE in hand, the states and utili-
ties again sought review in the D.C. Circuit. This time, the D.C. Cir-
cuit found in their favor, holding that the NWPA did not presuppose
the availability of a repository when it set the 1998 deadline and that
DOE had an unconditional obligation to meet its obligations under
the contract whether or not a facility was available.7 4 Since 1998 had
not yet come and the DOE had not yet breached, the court found it
unnecessary to determine the validity of the DOE's interpretation of
the unavoidable delays clause. 75
In response to the D.C. Circuit's Indiana Michigan Power Co. v.
Unoted States Department of Energy76 decision, the DOE informed the
power plant operators and the states that it would still not be able to
comply with the statutory deadline that the Indiana Michigan court
had reaffirmed. 77 In response to comments from contract holders
69 See Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272, 1274 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
70 Final Interpretation of Nuclear Waste Acceptance Issues, 60 Fed. Reg. 21,793,
21,793-94 (May 3, 1995).
71 See id.
72 Id. at 21,797 (quoting 10 C.F.R. § 961.11, art. IX (1995)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
73 See id.
74 See Ind. Mich. Power Co., 88 F.3d at 1277.
75 See id.
76 88 F.3d 1272.
77 See N. States Power Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 128 F.3d 754, 757 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
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regarding the anticipated delay, the DOE held that the Standard Con-
tract did not obligate it to provide a remedy, because the delay was
unavoidable. 78 Article IX of the Standard Contract defines unavoida-
ble delays as "acts of God, or of the public enemy, acts of Government
in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, fires, floods, epidemics,
quarantine restrictions, strikes, freight embargoes and unusually
severe weather. ''79 The DOE's contracting officer identified six factors
that, when taken together, support the conclusion that the DOE had
encountered an unavoidable delay due to acts of government in estab-
lishing a permanent repository at Yucca Mountain.80 The factors
included "technical problems; regulatory delays; roadblocks to imple-
mentation of [an interim facility]; funding restrictions; litigation
delays; and consultation requirements."81
The D.C. Circuit was less than pleased with the DOE's response
to its decision in Indiana Michigan.82 When the states and utilities
returned to the court to ask for a writ of mandamus to force the DOE
to comply with Indiana Michigan and begin accepting spent nuclear
fuel by the 1998 deadline, the court granted it, at least so far as it
precluded the DOE from excusing itself from its obligations under
the Standard Contract on the grounds that an unavoidable delay had
prevented it from establishing a permanent repository or an interim
storage program.83
. Congress has codified the common law writ of mandamus and by
statute federal courts "may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law." 84 Still, despite its presence in the U.S. Code, the
D.C. Circuit recognized that "[t] he remedy of mandamus is a drastic
one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations."85 However, the
court found that the states and the utilities had met the rigorous bur-
den for obtaining a writ.86
78 See id.
79 10 C.F.R. § 961.11, art. IX (2010).
80 See N. States Power Co., 128 F.3d at 760.
81 Id.
82 See id. at 757 ("After issuing our decision in Indiana Michigan, we would have
expected that the Department would proceed as if it had just been told that it had an
unconditional obligation to take the nuclear materials by the January 31, 1998, dead-
line. Not so.").
83 See id. at 756.
84 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2006).
85 X. States Power Co., 128 F.3d at 758 (alteration in original) (quoting Allied
Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980)).
86 See id.
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The Supreme Court has developed over the years a three-part test
for determining whether to issue a writ of mandamus. First, the party
seeking issuance of the writ should "have no other adequate means to
attain the relief he desires."87 Second, the petitioner must show that
his "right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable. ' 8 Third,
the issuing court must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under
the circumstances.8 9
In this case, the D.C. Circuit felt that the utilities had met this
burden by establishing that they had a clear right to relief, that the
DOE had a clear duty to act, 90 and a writ was appropriate in these
circumstances to prevent the DOE from recycling the losing argu-
ments in Indiana Michigan as to why it would not be able to perform
by the deadline mandated in both the statute and the contract.91
Whether or not the DOE had a permanent repository or interim facil-
ity ready byJanuary 31, 1998, it could not free itself of the costs caused
by its delay in performing its contractual obligations.92 The D.C. Cir-
cuit thus barred the DOE from implementing any interpretation of
the Standard Contract that excused its failure to perform by the dead-
line on the grounds of an unavoidable delay due to an act of Govern-
ment.9 3 It held that this could not possibly be a valid interpretation of
the contract, as "it would allow the Executive Branch to void an une-
quivocal obligation imposed by Congress" in the NWPA to begin per-
forming byJanuary 31, 1998.94 The "DOE has no authority to adopt a
contract that violates [a statute]."'95
II. THE POSTBREACH WORLD
Several months after the D.C. Circuit issued its writ of mandamus
in Northern States, the January 31, 1998, deadline came and went and
the federal government was officially in breach of its Standard Con-
tract with nuclear power plant operators.96 In the previous fifteen
87 Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976) (citing
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943)).
88 Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S.
379, 384 (1953)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89 See id.
90 See N. States Power Co., 128 F.3d at 758.
91 See id. at 760.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 See Greg Gordon, Missing a Deadline: Government Isn't Set to Accept Nuclear Waste,
STAR TRjB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 31, 1998, at A4.
2011] 1329
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
years since the enacting of the NM/PA, nuclear power plants-and by
extension the consumers who get their electricity from them-had
dumped more than twelve billion dollars into a fund for the construc-
tion of a repository that was still at least twelve years from comple-
tion.97 The plants were left with more than 37,000 tons of highly
radioactive spent fuel on their grounds, and since they were running
out of room in the reactors, the plants had to begin constructing steel-
lined cement casks on site for longer term storage.98
The casks, which look like giant concrete barrels and weigh about
130 tons when full,99 are costly to construct, and the nuclear power
plant operators were intent on having the DOE foot the bill. After the
1998 deadline passed and the government was officially in breach, sev-
eral utilities filed suit against the government in the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims, which under the Tucker Act' 00 has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over breach of contract claims against the federal government for
a value exceeding $10,000.101 With no unavoidable delays clause avail-
able to the .DOE due to the D.C. Circuit's writ of mandamus, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has jurisdiction over
appeals from the Court of Federal Claims, 0 2 held that the avoidable
delay clause remedies in the Standard Contract itself were no longer
sufficient.'0 3 By not limiting remedies to those contemplated in the
avoidable delays clause of the Standard Contract, these decisions had
the effect of opening "the DOE up to unlimited liability until such
obligation was met.' 0 4
Since both the unavoidable delays clause of the Standard Con-
tract, which relieved it of any liability, and the avoidable delays clause,
which at least limited the remedies, were now unavailable to the gov-
ernment, it had to proceed to trial against the utilities on damages
97 See Kathryn Winiarski & Paul Overberg, With Nowhere to Go, Nuclear Waste Piles
Up, USA TODAY, Dec. 31, 1998, at 6A.
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006).
101 See id. § 1346(a) (2) (mandating that the district courts shall have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Federal Claims for contract claims against the United
States not exceeding $10,000); Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 539 n.13 (1938)
("Under the Tucker Act, the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over
nontort claims against the Government for greater than $10,000.").
102 See28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
103 See Wall, supra note 7, at 171 (citing Me. Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United
States, 225 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2000); N. States Power Co. V. United States, 224
F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
104 Id. at 172.
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issues. 10 5 Thus, at the beginning of this decade, with dozens of other
utilities lined up to sue the DOE, it appeared likely that unless it
reached some sort of conclusive settlement, the government was likely
to spend much of the ensuing years litigating breach of contract suits
brought by the utilities. 10 6
And litigate it did. By 2007, the Office of Civilian Radioactive
Waste Management estimated that the government would owe at least
seven billion dollars in damages for delays in opening a permanent
geologic repository, with further delays increasing damage costs by
approximately half a billion dollars per year.1 0 7 At the time, the DOE
said the earliest possible date for the opening of a repository was
2017,108 and by November 2008, it had pushed that date back even
further to 2020.109 The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board,
which for the last two decades had been studying the proposed perma-
nent repository at Yucca Mountain, began, in September 2009, to dis-
cuss ways of reusing the spent nuclear fuel instead. 11 0 Some nuclear
power plant operators have urged that the DOE divert some of the
twenty-two billion dollars still sitting in the Nuclear Waste Fund to
developing new waste processing technologies.1 1 '
Both the Obama administration and Congress have given indica-
tions that they would like to abandon the Yucca Mountain project
entirely. In 2009, Congress slashed the proposed financing for it at
the behest of Senator Harry Reid of Nevada. 12 The Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management had cut its staff by about 2,000 people
in the eighteen months leading up to September 2009, leaving doubt
that it would have enough staff to answer questions from the NRC
during the ongoing licensing process."' In March 2010, the DOE
went so far as to file with the NRC a motion to withdraw with
prejudice its license application for the Yucca Mountain project. 114
But a three-judge panel of the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing
105 See Federal Circuit "Green Lights" Utilities' Breach Suits in Spent Fuel Cases, Gov'T
CONTRACTOR, Sept. 13, 2000, at 355.
106 See id.
107 See Matthew L. Wald, U.S. to Owe Billions for Delays in Nuclear Dump, Official Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2007, at C4.
108 See id.
109 See Wald, supra note 4.
110 See Matthew L. Wald, U.S. Panel Shifts Focus to Reusing Nuclear Fuel, N.Y. TIMrs,
Sept. 24, 2009, at A24.
111 See id.
112 See id.
113 See id.
114 See Department of Energy Files Motion to Withdraw Yucca Mountain License Applica-
tion, U.S. DEP'T ENERGY (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.energy.gov/news/8721.htm.
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Board rejected the motion, finding that the NWPA does not permit
the DOE to withdraw the application because it would contradict the
congressional policy that the NWPA embodies. I 15 Still, the Yucca
Mountain project received no funding in fiscal year 2011 budget
passed by Congress in April 2011.116 After working to eliminate any
funding for the project, Senator Reid declared, 'Yucca Mountain is
dead. And I think it's time for opponents to move on."' 17
III. REVISITING THE VALIDITY OF THE WRIT
So with the future of a permanent repository at Yucca Moun-
tain-or any other site-seriously in doubt, and in the absence of any
other clear long-term solution, it is fair to ask how the DOE and other
relevant parties in the federal government propose to address this crit-
ical issue of national significance going forward. Surely the govern-
ment cannot be content to simply litigate ongoing damages issues as
power plant operators continue to incur costs for storing the nuclear
waste the government was supposed to begin collecting more than a
decade ago, spending billions of taxpayer dollars in the process. But
with no repository or other long-term solution likely in the foresee-
able future, and with the D.C. Circuit and the Federal Circuit having
precluded the government from any defenses under the unavoidable
and avoidable delays clauses, does the government really have any
other option?
The remainder of this Note will argue that it should have another
option, and it is one that the government finally attempted to avail
itself of after a somewhat inexplicable and costly delay. When the
D.C. Circuit issued its writ of mandamus in Northern States in 1997 pre-
cluding the DOE from using the unavoidable delays clause as an
excuse for breaching the standard contract, 118 it was doing so under
the jurisdiction granted to it by the judicial review section of the
NWPA. 119 In issuing the writ, the D.C. Circuit was essentially inter-
preting the DOE's obligations under the Standard Contract. How-
ever, the D.C. Circuit has no statutory authority to interpret the
federal government's contractual obligations. The Tucker Act stipu-
115 See U.S. Dep't of Energy (High Level Waste Repository), LBP-10-11, slip op. at
3 (Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n June 29, 2010).
116 Karoun Demirjian, Despite House GOP Push, Harry Reid Declares 'Yucca Is Dead,'
LAS VEGAS SUN (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/apr/12/
despite-house-gop-push-harry-reid-declares-yucca-d.
117 Id.
118 See N. States Power Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 128 F.3d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
119 See 42 U.S.C. § 10139(a)(2) (2006).
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lates that plaintiffs find their remedy for breach of contract by the
federal government in the Court of Federal Claims,l20 with the narrow
exception that plaintiffs can bring breach of contract claims for less
than $10,000 in the district courts of the United States.' 2 ' Thus, the
D.C. Circuit's writ of mandamus was void for want of jurisdiction and
the government should again have the opportunity to raise the una-
voidable delays clause defense when defending suits in the Court of
Federal Claims for breach of the Standard Contract.
Even when it was issuing the writ of mandamus in Northern States,
the D.C. Circuit seemed to realize it was at least approaching the lim-
its of its jurisdiction under the NWPA.122 After the D.C. Circuit issued
the writ, the DOE petitioned for rehearing, suggesting that the D.C.
Circuit had "erroneously designated itself as the proper forum for
adjudication of disputes arising under the Standard Contract."123 The
court responded, though, that it was not adjudicating under the Stan-
dard Contract.1 24 It was "merely prohibit[ing] the DOE from imple-
menting an interpretation that would place it in violation of its duty
under the NWPA to assume an unconditional obligation to begin dis-
posal by January 31, 1998."125 The D.C. Circuit believed that "[t]he
statutory duty to include an unconditional obligation in the contract
is independent of any rights under the contract. The Tucker Act does
not prevent us from exercising jurisdiction over an action to enforce
compliance with the NWPA."'126
The D.C. Circuit seemed to further self-restrict its jurisdiction two
years later in Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. United States Department of
Energy.127 The plaintiff requested the court grant a writ of mandamus
ordering the DOE to "provide both monetary and non-monetary
relief for having failed to begin disposing of Wisconsin Electric's spent
nuclear fuel . . . on January 31, 1998."128 The DOE had taken the
position that it only needed to provide monetary relief, and the utility
felt that this violated the Northern States writ of mandamus, so it asked
the D.C. Circuit for another one.'2 9 The court disagreed, holding
120 See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (1) (2006).
121 See id. § 1346(a)(2).
122 See N. States Power Co., 128 F.3d at 761 (noting that the court retains jurisdiction
over the case pending compliance with the mandate).
123 N. States Power Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Nos. 97-1064, 98-1069, 98-1070, 97-
1065, 97-1370, 97-1398, 1998 WL 276581, at *2 (D.C. Cir. May 5, 1998) (per curiam).
124 See id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 211 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
128 Id. at 647.
129 See id. at 647-48.
2011] 1333
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
that although the writ "prohibit[ed] the DOE from interpreting the
NWPA and its contracts with utilities in a manner that would relieve
[it] of its unconditional obligation to begin disposing"130 nuclear
waste, the court "expressed no opinion about the relief the DOE
would have to provide for breach of that obligation.'
1 31
Additionally, the utility had petitioned for relief on the alterna-
tive grounds that the D.C. Circuit had jurisdiction to do so under the
judicial review section of the NWPA. 132 The court held though that,
aside from the scope of the Northern States writ, the NWPA itself did
not grant it the authority to provide the second sought-after writ
because a breach of contract by the DOE does not violate a statutory
duty and the judicial review section of the NWPA only covers actions
inconsistent with statutory duties. 13 3 The D.C. Circuit further held
that "[t]he Court of Federal Claims, not this court, is the proper
forum for adjudicating contract disputes. Indeed, [the utility's] peti-
tion raises issues that are currently being litigated before the Court of
Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit."' 3 4 The D.C. Circuit recog-
nized that its jurisdiction did not extend to any of the DOE's contrac-
tual obligations. However, it did not see the inconsistency in issuing a
writ of mandamus that made it all but inevitable that another federal
court would have to find the DOE in breach of its contract.
IV. MOUNTING A COLLATERAL ATTACK
Given the D.C. Circuit's own seeming awareness that it was com-
ing very close to the limits of its jurisdiction, it is surprising that the
government did not quickly launch a collateral attack on the Northern
States writ of mandamus when it began litigating against the utilities
for breach of the Standard Contract in the Court of Federal Claims.
However, seven years passed before Department of Justice (DOJ) law-
yers finally raised the issue in 2005 in Nebraska Public Power District v.
United States.135 Why did the government wait so long to collaterally
attack the writ of mandamus while incurring costly judgments against
it and the taxpayers in the Court of Federal Claims? The answer is not
entirely clear. When posed this question in a recent oral argument
before the Federal Circuit, the lawyer for the DOJ explained that
while there was the possibility to collaterally attack the Northern States
130 Id. at 648.
131 Id.
132 See id. at 647.
133 See id. at 648.
134 Id. (citations omitted).
135 73 Fed. CI. 650, 655 (2006), rev'd, 590 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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writ in earlier cases, the government was concerned about its compli-
ance with the writ and possible contempt sanctions if it did not do
so.
1 3 6 However, when the magnitude and stifling impact of the writ
came to light over the years, the government felt it had to finally chal-
lenge it.137 When questioned as to why the Federal Circuit should
not, on grounds of equitable estoppel, prevent the government from
challenging the writ now more than a decade after the D.C. Circuit
finally issued it, the DOJ lawyer pointed out that the issue here was
one of federal subject matter jurisdiction, which can never be waived
and which any party or the court can raise at any time.138 Addition-
ally, he noted that since utilities continue to bring breach of contract
suits in the Court of Federal Claims, the Northern States writ continues
to have a tremendous impact on the ongoing litigation.13 9
A. Can the Government Collaterally Attack the Writ?
So while the DOJ's explanation of why it waited so long to raise
the collateral attack is not tremendously convincing, when it finally
raised it in the Court of Federal Claims in Nebraska Public Power District,
it was initially successful in getting the writ struck down as void for
want of jurisdiction. 140 In a comprehensive decision, the Court of
Federal Claims considered several issues relating to the validity of the
writ. The first question was whether the government could even raise
a collateral attack to the D.C. Circuit's writ in the Court of Federal
Claims.1 41 The court stated that precedent from the Federal Circuit
indicates that "a party generally cannot avoid res judicata on the
grounds that a prior judgment was rendered by a court that lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, even if the jurisdictional issue was not liti-
gated in the first action."' 42 However, the court noted important
exceptions to the rule such as when allowing the judgment to stand
"would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal or
136 See Oral Argument at 56:00, Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 590 F.3d 1357 (No. 2007-
5083), available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/audiomp3/200 7-50 8 3 .
mp3.
137 See id.
138 See id. at 57:00-59:00; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (h) (3) ("If the court determines
at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.")
139 See Oral Argument, supra note 136, at 58:00.
140 Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 73 Fed. Cl. at 651-52.
141 See id. at 655.
142 Id. at 657.
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agency of government"143 or "improperly trench[ed] on sovereign
immunity."144
How the D.C. Circuit's Northern States writ of mandamus "substan-
tially infringed on the authority of another tribunal" should be fairly
clear. The writ stripped the government of one of its principle
defenses in claims involving the Standard Contract, forcing the gov-
ernment to basically concede liability and preventing the Court of
Federal Claims, which is the statutorily appropriate forum adjudicat-
ing contract claims, from properly evaluating the validity of the una-
voidable delays clause.
Regarding the assertion that the Northern States writ "improperly
trench[ed] on sovereign immunity," the court explained that "[a]
cadre of Supreme Court cases has particularly emphasized the impor-
tance of preserving sovereign immunity in allowing judgments issued
against the United States to be attacked collaterally." 145 The court did
not doubt that the judicial review section of the NWPA "affords the
D.C. Circuit (and other courts of appeals) jurisdiction over certain
issues,"' 46 but the court did not believe that it contained a waiver of
sovereign immunity.147 The Supreme Court has held that "[a] waiver
of the Federal Government's sovereign immunity must be unequivo-
cally expressed in statutory text and will not be implied."'1 48 The
Supreme Court has emphasized that "[t]he fact that Congress grants
jurisdiction to hear a claim does not suffice to show Congress has abro-
gated all defenses to that claim.' 149
The Court of Federal Claims in Nebraska Public Power District
asserted that the judicial review section of the NWPA bears a strong
resemblance to other jurisdictional statutes because it "lacks any...
specification of the remedy or relief that may be awarded against the
United States."'150 The court rejected the plaintiffs contention that
the NWPA derived its waiver of sovereign immunity from certain sec-
tions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) . 5 1 The plaintiff
143 Id. at 657 n.7 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 12(2) (1982)).
144 Id. at 657 (quoting Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1104 (D.C.
Cir. 1988)).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 666.
147 See id.
148 Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citation omitted) (citing United States
v. Nordic Viii., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34, 37 (1992); Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs,
498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)).
149 See Nordic ViU., Inc., 503 U.S. at 38 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak,
501 U.S. 775, 786 (1991)).
150 Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 73 Fed. CI. at 667.
151 See id. at 667-68.
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claimed the waiver was located in § 702 of the APA, 152 which provides
for judicial review for persons aggrieved by agency actions.1 53 How-
ever, the court persuasively reasoned that § 704154 of the APA controls
§ 702, because § 704 limits review of agency action to cases where
there is no other adequate remedy.155 In this instance of course,
there is an adequate remedy. The Tucker Act provides that persons
injured by the government's breach of a contract can find relief in the
Court of Federal Claims. 156 Thus, as the court in Nebraska Public Power
District wrote, "section 704 functions as a useful stoplight at the cross-
roads of the NWPA and the Tucker Act, directing when a particular
court in a given case should proceed vel non.'1 57 The waiver of sover-
eign immunity in this case, and where the utilities should have pro-
ceeded for their relief, was in the Court of Federal Claims under the
Tucker Act, not in the D.C. Circuit under the NWPA.
B. Is the Writ Void?
Once it established that a collateral attack was valid, the court
moved on to examine the crux of the matter-"whether the [Northern
States] writ [of mandamus] is void because it exceeds the jurisdiction
of the D.C. Circuit and correspondingly infringes upon the jurisdic-
tion of [the Court of Federal Claims]." 58 The court stated that "in
deciding contract interpretation issues, the D.C. Circuit plainly
exceeded the scope of [the judicial provision of the NWPA]."159
A decision the Federal Circuit had published just weeks before
the Court of Federal Claims published Nebraska Public Power District no
doubt helped the court along on the road to this decision. In PSEG
Nuclear L.L. C. v. United States,160 the Federal Circuit reversed a deci-
sion of the Court of Federal Claims and held that the NWPA did not
strip the Court of Federal Claims of its Tucker Act jurisdiction over
claims for breach of the Standard Contract. 61 The Federal Circuit
there noted that only a specific jurisdictional statute granting exclu-
sive jurisdiction to another court can supplant the Tucker Act's juris-
152 See id. at 667.
153 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
154 Id. § 704.
155 See Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 73 Fed. C1. at 667-72.
156 See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (1) (2006).
157 Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 73 Fed. C1. at 672.
158 Id. at 655.
159 Id. at 664.
160 465 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
161 See id. at 1351.
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diction over contract disputes involving the federal government. 162
The NWPA however, contains only one jurisdictional provision, the
judicial review section which provides for review of agency actions
taken while developing the permanent geologic repository for spent
nuclear fuel. 163
The Federal Circuit held that while the NWPA clearly mandated
that the DOE enter into contracts for the removal of spent nuclear
fuel and that it begin collecting that fuel byJanuary 31, 1998, the stat-
ute did not cover the performance of or damages resulting from a
failure to meet its obligations. 164 Since the claims at issue in these
cases involve only whether the DOE breached the Standard Contract
and what remedies to provide if it did, they do not fall within the
DOE's statutory obligations under the NWPA, which in turn does not
strip the Court of Federal Claims's Tucker Act jurisdiction over con-
tract disputes. 1 65
Building on the Federal Circuit's opinion in PSEG Nuclear, the
court in Nebraska Public Power District asserted that "[c]ritically, the
actions that were the subject of Indiana Michigan and the Northern
States decisions are not covered by the Federal Circuit's somewhat for-
giving construction of [the judicial review section of the NWPA.]"' 66
The provisions of the Standard Contract do not relate to agency
actions involving the creation of the permanent geologic repository,
which the PSEG Nuclear court declared would fall under the D.C. Cir-
cuit's NWPA jurisdiction. 167 The Standard Contract's provisions
assume the existence of a repository to facilitate the DOE's perform-
ance. 168 The court points out how the language in the Standard Con-
tract contains nothing about the particulars of establishing the
permanent geologic repository, but instead speaks of a world where
the repository is up and operational. 69 For example, Article II of the
Standard Contract states that "[t]he services to be provided by DOE
under this contract shall begin, after commencement of facility opera-
tions, not later than January 31, 1998. '170 Article 1V, which describes
162 See id. at 1349.
163 See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 10139 (2006) (granting judicial review of agency
actions to the U.S. Court of Appeals).
164 See PSEG Nuclear, 465 F.3d at 1350.
165 See id.
166 Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 650, 664 (2006), rev'd, 590
F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
167 See id.; see generally 10 C.F.R. § 961.11 (2010) (provisions of the Standard
Contract).
168 See Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 73 Fed. Cl. at 664.
169 See id.
170 10 C.F.R. § 961.11, art. II.
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each party's responsibilities under the Standard Contract, uses lan-
guage like the "DOE shall accept title to all [spent nuclear fuel] and/
or [high-level waste], of domestic origin, generated by the civilian
nuclear power reactor(s) .. . [and] provide subsequent transportation
for such material to the DOE facility."'17 1
Since the provisions of the Standard Contract have nothing to do
with the DOE's obligations to construct a facility for the disposal of
spent nuclear fuel, the judicial review section of the NWPA provides
no jurisdiction for the D.C. Circuit to interpret the DOE's obligations
under the Standard Contract. The Court of Federal Claims summa-
rized its holding in Nebraska Public Power District as follows:
The foregoing amply illustrates yet another reason why, in
describing where this court's jurisdiction begins, the Federal Circuit
sub silentio described where the D.C. Circuit's jurisdiction ends, to
wit, that the latter court's jurisdiction does not extend beyond
reviewing agency actions under Title III [of the NWPA] that relate
to the creation of the repository. The decisions in Indiana Michigan
and Northern States bounded across the latter line, thereby intruding
on this court's jurisdiction. 72
C. The Christopher Village Decision
In deciding Nebraska Public Power District, the Court of Federal
Claims was able to draw on a recent Federal Circuit decision where
that court directly examined the jurisdictional capacity of federal dis-
trict courts and courts of appeals to infringe on the Court of Federal
Claims's Tucker Act jurisdiction. In Christopher Village, L.P. v. United
States,173 the court held that "the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, and on appeal the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, lacked jurisdiction to issue . . . a 'predi-
cate' judgment" as to the government's liability for a breach of con-
tract.174 In Christopher Village the plaintiff-appellants had entered into
a contract with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) pursuant to a statute, the United States Housing Act, 175
which "authorized HUD to enter into contracts with landlords to sub-
sidize rental payments of tenants living in private, low-income
housing."76
171 Id. § 961.11, art. V (emphasis added).
172 Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 73 Fed. Cl. at 664.
173 360 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
174 Id. at 1321.
175 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437bbb-9 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
176 Christopher ViU., 360 F.3d at 1322 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437(0 (2000); Cisneros v.
Alpine Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. 10, 12 (1993)).
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In this particular case, HUD took over the property of the plain-
tiff-appellants after it determined that they had failed to adequately
maintain the property.' 77 In response, the plaintiff-appellants filed
suit against HUD in the Southern District of Texas seeking a writ of
mandamus to prevent HUD from foreclosing on their property. 78
They "also sought a declaratory judgment that their obligation to
maintain the property was contingent upon receiving adequate rent
revenue [through the United States Housing Act contracts] °"179 After
the district court granted summary judgment for HUD on the
grounds that HUD's decisions to grant rent increases were unreview-
able, the plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which held that HUD
had violated its contractual and regulatory duties by failing to con-
sider the plaintiff-appellants' request for rent increases. 180 It reversed
the district court's grant of summary of judgment and ordered the
district court on remand to issue the plaintiff-appellants' sought-after
declaratory judgment. 181
Armed with that declaratory judgment, the plaintiff-appellants
then filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims for breach of contract,
claiming that resjudicata prevented the government from attempting
to relitigate the issue and "entitled [them] to a finding of liability
against HUD as a matter of law."' 82 The court rejected this assertion,
holding that " [ r] es judicata presumes that the first court had jurisdic-
tion over the claim .... As such, resjudicata does not bar the govern-
ment from raising defenses to plaintiffs' breach of contract claim in
this instance. '183
On appeal, the Federal Circuit, in upholding the Court of Fed-
eral Claims, explained that "[i] n order for a district court [in this case,
the District Court for the Southern District of Texas,] to have properly
had jurisdiction, the government must have waived sovereign immu-
nity to suit. '184 Similar to its statement in PSEG Nuclear, here the
court held that a clear statement from the government is necessary to
find a waiver of sovereign immunity.' 85 Since under the Tucker Act,
the plaintiff-appellants in this case had an adequate remedy for the
177 See id. at 1323.
178 See id.
179 Id.
180 See id. at 1324.
181 See id.
182 Id.
183 Christopher Vill., L.P. v. United States, 53 Fed. CI. 182, 188 (2002), affd, 360
F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
184 Christopher Vill., 360 F.3d at 1327.
185 See id.
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government's alleged breach of contract in the Court of Federal
Claims, § 704 of the APA, with its "no adequate remedy" provision, did
not grant jurisdiction to the District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, or by extension the Fifth Circuit.18 6 Referencing a previous
decision, the court stated that "[a] party may not circumvent the
Claims Court's exclusive jurisdiction by framing a complaint . . . as
one seeking injunctive, declaratory or mandatory relief where the
thrust of the suit is to obtain money from the United States.' 187 The
court went on to cite ample precedent from other circuits, including
the D.C. Circuit, which recognizes this construction of the APA and
the Court of Federal Claims's exclusive jurisdiction under the Tucker
Act over contract claims. 188
As the Court of Federal Claims would do two years later in
Nebraska Public Power District, the Federal Circuit here considered the
issue that although the Fifth Circuit lacked subject matter jurisdiction,
lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not usually strip a decision of
its preclusive effect. 189 However, drawing on the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,' 90 the
court concluded that an affirmative decision by Congress to grant
exclusive jurisdiction to one court "render[s] void a judgment [by
another court] that treads upon that exclusive jurisdiction."19'
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the Court found void a
decision by a federal district court in Missouri against an Indian
Nation because "Indian Nations [were] exempt from suit without
Congressional authorization," as their sovereign immunity had passed
186 See id. at 1327-29.
187 Id. at 1328 (first alteration in original) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. U.S.
Dep't of Energy, 247 F.3d 1378, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
188 See id. ("'[T]he Tucker Act-which waives sovereign immunity and provides
the United States Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) with jurisdiction over cer-
tain claims for monetary relief from the federal Government-provides an adequate
remedy in the Claims Court, which would preclude district court jurisdiction under
§ 704 of the APA.'" (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Deaf Smith
Cnty. Grain Processors, Inc. v. Glickman, 162 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1998))
(internal quotation mark omitted)); id. ("[R]eview under the APA is available only
for 'final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court' . . . ." (first
alteration in original) (quoting Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 346 (4th Cir.
1996))); id. ("A party may not avoid the [Court of Federal Claims'] jurisdiction by
framing an action against the federal government that appears to seek only equitable
relief when the party's real effort is to obtain damages in excess of $10,000." (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Marshall Leasing, Inc. v. United States, 893 F.2d 1096, 1099
(9th Cir. 1990))).
'189 See id. at 1329-30.
190 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
191 Christopher Vill., 360 F.3d at 1331.
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to Congress.' 92 Congress had only authorized suits against Indian
Nations in U.S. courts in Indian Territories. 193 Since the judgment of
the federal court in Missouri was void, the Supreme Court reversed a
decision by a federal court in Oklahoma giving that judgment preclu-
sive effect.194 The Federal Circuit in Christopher Village, thus held that
" [r]espect for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims
is no less important than respect for the exclusive jurisdiction of...
the Indian Territory courts'1 95 or any other federal court to which
Congress has granted exclusive jurisdiction of any subject matter. 196
The Fifth Circuit's decision "did not merely exceed the court's juris-
diction, it 'directly implicat[ed] issues of sovereign immunity,' and is
therefore void [and] not entitled to preclusive effect, despite the fact
that the court's jurisdiction was not challenged on direct review." 197
As it was with the Fifth Circuit in Christopher Village, so it is with the
D.C. Circuit in Nebraska Public Power District. The D.C. Circuit's writ of
mandamus in Northern States infringed on the jurisdiction of another
federal court and subjected the government to judgment in a matter
in which it had not waived its sovereign immunity in that particular
court. The writ is thus void and not entitled to preclusive effect in
other federal courts.
D. The Megapulse Decision
After the court in Nebraska Public Power District declared the D.C.
Circuit's writ of mandamus void and lacking preclusive effect in
regards to the unavoidable delays clause in the Standard Contract,198
the plaintiffs asked the court to certify the decision to the Federal
Circuit for interlocutory appeal.' 99 By statute, a court may grant an
interlocutory appeal when "a controlling question of law is involved
with respect to which there is a substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from that order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. '" 20 0 While the
court acknowledged that it traditionally reserves interlocutory appeals
192 See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 512.
193 See id. at 513.
194 See id. at 514-15.
195 Christopher Vill., 360 F.3d at 1332.
196 See id.
197 Id. at 1333 (first alteration in original) (quoting Int'l Air Response v. United
States, 324 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
198 See Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 650, 674 (2006), rev'd,
590 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
199 See Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 762, 763 (2006).
200 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(2) (2006).
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for only exceptional or rare cases, given the tremendous impact of the
Northern States writ in this case and all cases involving breach of the
Standard Contract, interlocutory appeal was appropriate in this
instance.201 Notably, the government did not oppose the court's certi-
fying the issue for interlocutory appeal, logically not wanting to liti-
gate on the basis of having the unavoidable delays clause defense
available if the Federal Circuit was merely going to reinstate the D.C.
Circuit's Northern States writ. 202
After a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit initially heard
oral arguments on December 3, 2007, the court, without coming to a
decision on the merits, voted on its own accord to rehear the case en
banc.203 The en banc panel finally heard oral arguments on Septem-
ber 18, 2009.204
On appeal, the utilities attempted to draw support for the validity
of the Northern States writ from a decision by the D.C. Circuit in
Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis.20 5 In Megapulse, a government contractor
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia and sought to enjoin the Coast Guard from releasing cer-
tain proprietary data on the grounds that it violated the Trade Secrets
Act. 20 6 The D.C. Circuit framed the issue as "whether a government
contractor can step outside the Tucker Act and seek an injunction in
the district court to prevent an alleged violation of the Trade Secrets
Act when the data involved were originally provided to the govern-
ment pursuant to the terms of various contracts." 20 7 The district court
found that it had no jurisdiction. 20 8
The D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that "agency action" existed in
the Coast Guard's decision to release the propriety data.209 It held
that the petitioner's claim in this instance was not "at its essence" a
contract action, 210 stating that "the mere fact that a court may have to
rule on a contract issue does not, by triggering some mystical meta-
morphosis, automatically transform an action based on trespass or
conversion into one on the contract and deprive the court ofjurisdic-
201 See Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 74 Fed. Cl. at 763-64.
202 See id. at 763.
203 See Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States, 335 F. App'x 42, 43 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(per curiam).
204 See Oral Argument, supra note 136, at 56:00.
205 672 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 50-55, Neb.
Pub. Power Dist., 335 F. App'x 42 (No. 2007-5083)
206 See Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 962-63.
207 Id. at 963-64.
208 See id. at 964.
209 See id. at 966, 971.
210 See id. at 968-71.
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tion it might otherwise have." 2 11 It went on to explain that "'[i]t is not
at all unusual for a court to . . . decide [a secondary] issue which
would be outside its jurisdiction if raised directly.'"212 And although
the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over contract disputes
over $10,000, it does not have exclusive jurisdiction over contract-
related issues arising in other actions. 213
The D.C. Circuit emphasized that the petitioner's claims against
the government are not merely contract claims in disguise.214 The
petitioner did not claim breach of contract and it did not seek any
monetary damages. 215 The court found that the petitioner was not
relying on the contract at all.2 16 Rather, it was "the Government, and
not Megapulse, which [was] relying on the contract, attempting to
show that the Coast Guard lawfully came into possession of the prop-
erty and [was] empowered by the contract to put the entrusted infor-
mation out for commercial use." 217 The government should not be
able to avoid injunctions against activities that violate statutory duties,
in this case its duty not to disclose confidential information under the
Trade Secrets Act, "simply by contracting not to engage in those
activities." 218
The petitioners in Nebraska Public Power District argued that the
Megapulse standard should apply here because the sources of the
plaintiffs' claims in Indiana Michigan and Northern States were statu-
tory, not contractual. 219 They asserted that the D.C. Circuit restricted
its limited writ of mandamus from Northern States to ordering DOE to
honor its statutory obligations under the NWPA.220 The Northern
States writ did not force the DOE to begin collecting the spent nuclear
fuel by the January 31, 1998, deadline, as the Standard Contract stipu-
lated. It only ordered the DOE to recognize that it had an uncondi-
tional obligation and could not use the unavoidable delays clause of
the Standard Contract to escape that obligation. 221 In other words, as
in Megapulse, the fact that the relief granted by the D.C. Circuit's writ
of mandamus had spillover consequences for the DOE under the
211 Id. at 968.
212 Id. (quoting De Magno v. United States, 636 F.2d 714, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
213 See id.
214 See id. at 969.
215 See id.
216 See id.
217 See id.
218 Id. at 971.
219 See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 205, at 53.
220 See id.
221 See id.
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Standard Contract did not mean that the D.C. Circuit had infringed
on the Court of Federal Claims's exclusive Tucker Act jurisdiction in
issuing the writ.222
The Court of Federal Claims in Nebraska Public Power District spe-
cifically considered the Megapulse factors in its decision but still
reached the conclusion that the D.C. Circuit exceeded its jurisdiction
in this case. 223 It pointed out that unlike the petitioners in Megapulse,
who were not relying on the contract at all in their claim, the plaintiffs
before the D.C. Circuit in Indiana Michigan and Northern States sought
monetary damages and other relief that was basically the equivalent of
specific performance of a contract.224
The court's reasoning is sound as the facts of the two cases are
readily distinguishable. In Megapulse, the fact that the government
came into possession of the plaintiff's proprietary data, which it then
sought to share more widely, through a contract, is incidental to the
plaintiffs claim under the Trade Secrets Act. The plaintiff would
likely have had the same Trade Secrets Act claim if the government
had acquired its proprietary data through any number of other meth-
ods. The plaintiffs in Megapulse did not follow up their victory in the
D.C. Circuit with a breach of contract claim in the Court of Federal
Claims. They had no reason to do so as they only needed injunctive
relief based on a statute. The Northern States writ, however, altered
completely how the government would be able to defend itself in
breach of contract claims involving the Standard Contract. By hold-
ing that a section of the Standard Contract, the unavoidable delays
clause, was invalid, the D.C. Circuit was interpreting a contract and
when the utilities proceeded directly to the Court of Federal Claims
with their breach of contract claims, the government had little choice
but to admit liability and litigate solely on the issue of damages.
V. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT's REVERSAL
Unfortunately for those hoping that the Court of Federal
Claims's decision in Nebraska Public Power District would open the road
to a long-term solution to the nation's nuclear waste problem, in Janu-
ary 2010, a majority of the en banc panel of the Federal Circuit
reversed the Court of Federal Claims, finding that the D.C. Circuit did
not improperly infringe on the Court of Federal Claims's Tucker Act
222 See id. at 53-54.
223 See Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States, 73 Fed. C1. 650, 665 (2006), rev'd,
590 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
224 See id.
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jurisdiction by issuing the Northern States writ.22 5 The court's analysis
on this main point was notably brief. It held that "[o]nce the D.C.
Circuit construed the NWPA to require DOE to begin accepting
nuclear waste by 1998, it was not a significant further step to conclude
that Congress did not intend for DOE to avoid that statutory obliga-
tion by adopting a contrary interpretation of the Standard
Contract."22 6
A lengthy dissent found fault with this proposition, pointing out
that "the D.C. Circuit actually forbids the United States from defend-
ing itself in a contract action in the Court of Federal Claims. '22 7 The
dissent then went on to argue that "the issue of remedy, and specifi-
cally, whether there should be no remedy because of 'unavoidable
delay,' only applies if a party has failed to perform its obligations
under the contract."228 Thus, the dissent points out that contrary to
the premise of the D.C. Circuit's writ, "whether the DOE uses the
Unavoidable Delays clause to minimize or prevent having to pay dam-
ages for failing to meet the 'unconditional obligation' to begin dispos-
ing of [spent nuclear fuel] . . . is a separate inquiry from whether the
contract properly incorporates the statutorily mandated uncondi-
tional deadline into its terms."22 9 The dissent concluded that the
NWPA "is entirely silent on the issue of contractual remedies (or even
whether the contract has to provide any monetary damages at all).
Therefore, there is no reasonable argument here that the D.C. Cir-
cuit's jurisdiction could extend to any reliance by the DOE on the
Standard Contract's Unavoidable Delays clause." 230 So despite there
being no mandate in the NWPA for the DOE's provision of contrac-
tual remedies, the D.C. Circuit's writ, now unfortunately affirmed by
the Federal Circuit, has basically locked the DOE, and by extension
the American taxpayer, into litigating damages against nuclear power
plant operators in one law suit after another.
CONCLUSION: OPENING THE ROAD TO A NEW SOLUTION
In its now-reversed decision in Nebraska Public Power District, the
Court of Federal Claims explained how the Northern States writ of man-
damus has hindered the orderly progression of nuclear waste litiga-
225 Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States, 590 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
226 Id. at 1375.
227 Id. at 1377 (GajarsaJ., dissenting).
228 See id. at 1382.
229 Id.
230 Id.
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tion in a number of different areas. 231 First, while the court issued the
writ in response to an administrative position taken by the DOE, it
tied the hands of the DOJ, which is responsible for defending the gov-
ernment in litigation before the Court of Federal Claims. 232 Second,
the Northern States writ has prevented so far the Court of Federal
Claims "from resolving an important liability issue on the merits, a
contract issue that this court manifestly has jurisdiction to decide and
whose resolution potentially impacts at least sixty pending cases,
involving tens of billions of dollars in claims."
233
Lifting the Northern States writ of mandamus would have been
some sort of elixir that solved the nation's six-decade-old nuclear
waste problem. But as it stands now, with the Northern States writ in
force, neither side has much of an incentive to look for new solutions.
The utilities know that they can continue to build costly dry casks for
on-site storage and bring suits for damages in the Court of Federal
Claims, where the government has no defense to liability. The two
sides will haggle over the damages, but the utilities can be confident
that the government will end up picking up most of the tab. In oral
arguments before the en banc panel of the Federal Circuit in Nebraska
Public Power District, the utilities' lawyer acknowledged, "we are in trial
almost all the time. We have one starting next Tuesday. We will be
talking about acceptance rate. We will be talking about damages. We
will be talking about offsets .... We've been through this many times.
We know their expert witnesses. They know ours."
234
From the government's perspective, since it is locked into its obli-
gations under the Standard Contract, it has reduced incentive to look
for other solutions besides a permanent geologic repository. Under
these circumstances, it makes sense to keep plugging away at Yucca
Mountain, even though that project is now twenty-two years behind
schedule. 235 Even if it ever is able to abandon the construction of a
permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, with the Northern
States writ of mandamus still in force, the government will still be lia-
ble for breach of the Standard Contract for an indeterminate period
into the future.
How the government should proceed if it is again able to invoke
the unavoidable delays clause of the Standard Contract is beyond the
scope of this Note. The hope is that the ability to invoke the unavoid-
231 See 73 Fed. Cl. 650, 673 (2006), rev'd, 590 F. 3d 1357.
232 See id.
233 Id.
234 Oral Argument, supra note 136, at 18:04.
235 Wald, supra note 4 (reporting that the federal government now projects that
Yucca Mountain will not be operational until the year 2020 at the earliest).
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able delays clause will at least change the nature of this litigation
enough to encourage both the DOE and the nuclear power plant
operators to look for a new long-term solution to this critical public
policy problem.
